The Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 was a major development in the Cold War and has drawn constant scholarly interest. Recently declassified American and Soviet diplomatic records and relevant materials published in China and India make it possible to probe the conflict from a broader international perspective. A reinvestigation of India’s post-independence diplomatic policy shows that the border conflict was an inevitable outcome of Nehru’s diplomatic policy. Similarly, the conflict embodied the theory and practice of China’s “revolutionary diplomacy” and was not simply a boundary question. Behind the border conflict were fundamental differences between China and the Soviet Union over a series of important theories and international strategies, which constituted topics of the polemics leading to their eventual split.

I. The Substance of Indian Foreign Policy after Independence and Indian Policy on Sino-Indian Boundary Question

It is generally believed that it was logical for Nehru to choose a non-alignment policy for post-independence India because of his chronic suspicion of the West and the uncertainty of American reaction to Asian nationalism. However, the domestic situation and, more importantly, the onset of the Cold War in the global arena impacted greatly on India’s diplomacy. First of all, the unprecedented famine and economic difficulties in the early years after the Second World War forced the govern­ment to seek economic aid from the West. Nehru, addressing the Lok Sabha (House of the People) on 22 April 1949, openly declared that India would incline toward the United States.

 Soviet policy towards India in the early days of the Cold War again pushed Nehru to the American side. Nehru hoped an independent India could foster good relations with the Soviet Union, but Soviet diplomacy under Stalin drew a clear distinction between friends and enemies according to the “two big camps,” and held that the Nehru government was gradually turning India into a “military police of English and American imperialism.”

Nehru’s policy was based on his knowledge and understanding of communism. He made known his anti-Communist stance on many occasions. With his tacit consent, many states in India declared the Communist Party of India (CPI) illegal, shut down its publications and arrested large numbers of its leaders and members. More significantly, Nehru linked opposition to colonialism with “resistance to the expansion of communism in Asia.” Meanwhile, Nehru’s non-alignment policy had special implications. He said in December 1956 that neutrality did not mean unprincipled indifference to both despotic and democratic governments, and that India would make its own choice in due course. He also said India’s friendly relations with the Soviet Union and China were not due to its interest in the two countries, but to the needs of national security.

As far as America’s strategy was concerned, its main consideration in developing relations with India was containment of China. Indian-American relations made considerable progress during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. In May 1961 the American Congress appropriated 500 million dollars for Indian economic development. Kennedy was of the opinion that he could not deal with “Communist China” without India.

Rapidly improving US-Indian relations and changes in Soviet India policy under Khrushchev induced Nehru to adopt a hard line on the Sino-Indian boundary question. Soon after the signing of the “Agreement on Trade and Contact between the Tibet Region of China and India” in 1954, Nehru issued instructions to departments concerned that India should take a resolute and clear stand on the issue of the Northern Frontier, which was not negotiable with anyone. He also said the border outpost system should extended to the whole of the northern border. On 2 November 1961 India’s decision-makers finally adopted the “advancing policy.” Subsequently, India sped up military preparations to carry this out. A total of 43 outposts were set up by India along the Sino-Indian border from 1959 to 1962.

On the other hand, India sought diplomatic support and military aid from America long before the Sino-Indian border conflict broke out. Not a few people in the American government voiced their support for India.

II. Rebellion in Tibet, Boundary Question and Changes in Sino-Indian Relations

China’s India policy embodied, first of all, changes in the policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) towards nationalist states against the background of Cold War, especially Mao Zedong’s theory of the “intermediate zone.” Originally, the CPC leaders hoped India would follow the road of Chinese revolution and a free India would eventually become a member of the socialist democratic community. India took the initiative to develop relations with New China in the early days of its founding; China, for its part, pursued a diplomatic policy of “peaceful coexistence” in the wake of the Korean War, and Mao in particular advanced his “intermediate zone” theory around this time. These events promoted a “honeymoon” in Sino-Indian relations. Mao placed India in his third category, i.e., “oppressed nations and states led by patriotic groups or parties rather than communist parties.” The neutrality of those countries meant, in Mao’s view, they acted “independently and of their initiative, not swayed by others.” China was happy with this stand because it was favorable to the cause of peace, rather than to imperialist schemes of aggression and war. In later statements Mao further pointed out, “Of the three ‘-isms’—communism, nationalism and imperialism—the first two are closer to each other.”¹ China’s policy towards India at that time thus embodied a basic judgment regarding the nature of nationalist regimes by the Central Committee of the CPC.

Rebellion in Tibet in 1959 brought about a 180-degree turn in the attitude of Chinese leaders towards India’s foreign policy and Nehru himself. The CPC leaders held that the Tibetan rebellion was the last fierce and serious class struggle on the mainland, which was incited, at home, by Tibetan rebellious groups and, abroad, by a section of the big bourgeoisie in India. After putting down the Tibetan rebellion, Mao Zedong said, “Let the Indian authorities keep on doing unrighteous deeds. We will settle accounts with them later.” As for Nehru，Mao said in clear terms, “Criticize him incisively. Don’t be afraid of provoking him and falling out with him. We’ll fight him to the end.”²

The boundary question was another important factor prompting the CPC leaders to reevaluate Nehru’s foreign policy. In light of the fundamental differences between China and India on the boundary question, on 23 January 1959 Zhou Enlai wrote to Nehru expounding China’s basic stand on the Sino-Indian boundary question and pointing out: (1) The boundary had never been formally delimited; the Chinese side suggested a comprehensive settlement of the issue; (2) Before reaching a comprehensive settlement, both sides should maintain the present state of the boundary that had long existed; temporary settlement of the local disputes that had occurred should be reached through discussion. In his reply letter dated 22 March Nehru did not agree to Zhou’s statement and asked China to officially recognize the boundary as set when India was under British rule.

The Tibet and Sino-Indian boundary questions spurred the CPC leaders to reappraise Nehru’s foreign policy; more significantly, they were induced, Mao Zedong in particular, to reconsider the “intermediary zone” theory and the role of nationalist states in order to streamline China’s principles and policies. China’s India policy underwent a change. The CPC leaders believed that the boundary dispute had been provoked by India, which was becoming a “reactionary nationalist state.” Nehru was playing the Sino-Indian boundary card to tighten his control of the Rightist group and the Congress Party, and to strike blows at the Leftist group. In this he could seek aid from both America and the Soviet Union. The Indian government did not want to solve the issue peacefully. “The Indian people are now beginning to see through the role Nehru has been playing. He is now a reactionary.” In a speech on 14 September 1962 to the East China group during the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC, Chen Yi stressed, “A lot of facts prove that our struggle against the united front of Kennedy, Khrushchev and Nehru is necessary and un­av­oid­able. But this struggle has proper limits and restraints. We cannot say we are going too far in our struggle.”³

Guided by the above theories and ideas, on 29 September 1962 the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC further clarified the guiding principle of Chinese foreign policy, concluding, “class struggle is fiercely under way in the international arena.” Hence the main task of Chinese diplomacy in the long run was to “wage a resolute and thorough struggle against revisionism, the principal danger in the international communist movement, against dogmatism, against sectarianism, and against great-nation chauvinism and narrow-minded nationalism.” Now China’s revolutionary diplomacy” had acquired more glaring characteristics.