III.             Stand of the Soviet Union on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question

and the Sino-Soviet Relations

The stand of the Soviet Union on Tibet and the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1959 reflected changes in the diplomatic policy of the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and the impact of these changes on Sino-Soviet and Soviet-Indian relations. China’s reactions to the Soviet policy, moreover, highlighted fundamental differences between the two on a number of important international issues and their assessments of the international situation since the middle and late 1950s.

After Stalin’s death, tuned to a foreign policy of “peaceful coexistence” advocated by Khrushchev, the USSR reversed its policy towards India. Khrushchev said at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in July 1955 that if India joined the socialist camp in the wake of China Western capitalism would definitely be on the wane. The Soviet Union would therefore launch an offensive in less developed areas.⁴

A TASS statement of 9 September 1959 clearly conveyed the Soviet stand on the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1959. Khrushchev expressed regret and sorrow over the Sino-Indian border dispute at meeting of the Supreme Soviet on 30 October and hoped the boundary question would be peacefully settled. On 22 December, the Soviet newspapers broke with their usual practice and published India’s note to China before gauging reactions from China.

Regarding the TASS statement and the Soviet stand, the Central Committee of the CPC wrote to its Soviet counterpart on 13 September 1959 criticizing the Soviet government for an “over-lenient and compromising stand on important and principled matters.” In another letter the Central Committee emphatically pointed out that the Nehru government had long been “marching in the reactionary direction in its domestic and foreign policies.” “We believe that if one carries out only the policy of unprincipled adjustment and concessions to Nehru and the Indian government…such a policy would only encourage…them to move toward the West.” In the Soviet opinion, “The Chinese comrades could neither correctly assess their own mistakes committed in their relations with India, nor the measures taken by the CC CPSU to moderate the Sino-Indian conflict.”⁵

On a visit to Beijing in October 1959, Khrushchev quarreled bitterly with the CPC leaders over the Sino-Indian boundary question, doing irreparable damage to relations between the two parties and countries. During the same period, swayed by the Soviet policies, other socialist countries and communist parties also struck out on new paths, supporting Soviet policy on the question. At the Congress of Communist and Workers’ Parties held in Moscow in November 1960, delegates from many countries criticized the Chinese policy over the Sino-Indian boundary question, praising Soviet policy and the TASS statement on this question as “correct, wise and timely.” Reactions from these Communist Parties strengthened the CPC’s conviction that it must wage a counter­attack on “revisionist” thought and action as manifested over the Sino-Indian boundary question.

The respective policies and stands of China and the Soviet Union on the Sino-Indian boundary question before the conflict broke out in 1962 clearly pointed to the fact that their differences were of a strategic nature, i.e., they differed on how “peaceful coexistence” was perceived and on what principles to adopt towards nationalist countries like India, far more than any differences over specific policies on territories and international boundaries. There clearly was scant room for compromise.

IV. Sino-Indian Border Conflict of 1962：Course and Big-power Diplomacy

Following the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border conflict, Nehru called for the Soviet Union to get involved in the conflict and openly asked for military aid from the West. He sent a letter to Kennedy on 26 October, pleading for sympathy and support “at this moment of crisis.” As India rejected China’s ceasefire proposal, the PLA took military action again on 18 November. Without prior consultation with the Cabinet, Nehru sent two urgent letters on the same day of 20 November, calling on the U.S. to form an alliance with India, to intervene in Sino-Indian border conflict and take a direct part in the fighting.⁶

Meanwhile, when the conflict broke out the US and Britain immediately acted in support of India. The American government not only provided emergency military aid to India, but also supplied military intelligence on China. At the same time, twelve C-130 big air-freighters flew to India, helping transport the Indian troops from the front of Kashmir to the eastern sector of the boundary. To express further support for India, Kennedy instructed American ambassador Kenneth Galbraith to make a statement supporting India’s claim to the disputed territories and recognizing the “McMahon Line” as the customary international boundary line. On 14 November, India and the U.S. signed an agreement in Washington on American military aid. Britain also adopted a tough and clear-cut attitude on the Sino-Indian border conflict.

Having secured pledges of diplomatic support and military assistance from the U.S. and Britain, Nehru tried to get the maximum support from the Soviet Union. A few hours after the border conflict broke out Khrushchev sent a letter to Nehru through the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, expressing regret for the conflict between two “friendly countries” and calling on them to hold negotiations after cease-fire. When China proposed a cease-fire, the Soviet government expressed the hope that India would accept the Chinese proposal and hold talks with them. Pravda also conveyed the same idea in its editorial of 25 October. At first Nehru was very unhappy with the Soviet policy, especially with the Pravda editorial. However, during his second meeting with Khrushchev on 24 November Kaul found Khrushchev had switched his policy. Khrushchev said that in the previous meeting he could not commit himself to military aid for India because the Cuban missile crisis had been at a climax, with the Soviet Union needing to prepare for war. Now Khrushchev promised to provide India with whatever military equipment possible.⁷

Apart from the tough reactions of the U.S. and Britain, other factors such as the Sino-Soviet relations, the Cuban missile crisis, attitudes of countries in Asia and Africa and the split of the Communist Party of India all had important bearing on the course of the Sino-Indian border conflict.

 Before the Sino-Indian border conflict broke out in 1962 the Soviet Union expressed support for China on the question. Khrushchev openly declared at a send-off dinner for returning Chinese ambassador Liu Xiao that the Soviet Union stood on the Chinese side on the question of Sino-Indian border dispute – this was the uniform stand of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. Diplomats from East European countries like East Germany and Hungary stressed once and again to Chinese officials that the fraternal parties of socialist countries must compromise and cooperate with one another, especially when there existed serious hostility and potential wars with imperialism. Under the guidance of the above Soviet policy, Pravda carried an editorial on 25 October 1962 on the Sino-Indian border conflict, condemning the McMahon Line that had led to the dispute as notorious and invalid and denouncing India as the prime culprit of the dispute. It also criticized the Communist Party of India for having “slipped into the quagmire of chauvinism,” harming proletarian internationalism. That day, the Chinese government issued a statement on the Cuban missile crisis, “fully supporting” the Soviet stand. China voiced its support on the Cuban issue in its own way but did not respond to the request from Khrushchev. Therefore in the eyes of the Soviet leaders China’s support was far from enough.

The missile crisis ended with the forced withdrawal of missiles from Cuba by the Soviet Union. This decision triggered a fierce attack by China on the Soviet policy. The CPC released a series of statements and articles criticizing Soviet policy and stand by praising the anti-American struggle of the Cuban people. Pravda issued a statement on 5 November reaffirming the Soviet neutral stand on the Sino-Indian boundary question. This led the leaders of the CPC to think Khrushchev had sought to exchange Soviet support on the border dispute for Chinese support for the Soviet Union on the missile crisis. After the missile crisis, “Khrushchev saw no need for Chinese support because the crisis in the Caribbean Sea had passed. Further, he had lost all face in the crisis and poured his wrath upon China.” “So he launched a new round of attacks against China.”⁸

Another significant factor influencing the Chinese foreign policy during the Sino-Indian border conflict was the reaction of the Afro-Asian nations. Only a few countries including Vietnam, Korea, Burma and Pakistan openly supported China while the number opposing China’s military action and sympathizing with and supporting India reached as many as 75. In addition, the role played by the Communist Party of India in the Sino-Indian border dispute also corroborated an important theory of the CPC that it was necessary to resolutely fight against revisionism in the international communist movement. In February 1961, the National Committee of the CPI adopted a “Resolution on the Sino-Indian border conflict,” openly “supporting the customary boundary line in the west sector and considering the McMahon Line as the actual boundary line in the east sector.” This stand of the CPI was more clear-cut following the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border conflict. The CPI’s attitude drew a severe and unequivocal reaction from the CPC.